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Abstract
This paper proposes a model of turnout in which citizens have a preference for conformism,
which adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Under this environment
multiple equilibria arise, some that generate a (more realistic) high level of turnout, for a
wide rage of parameter values. It is also shown that high levels of turnout are robust to the
introduction of asymmetry and heterogeneity in the parameter governing the preference for
conformism and with respect to the reference group for conformism.
This model suggests that high turnout can only be achieved as the outcome of a particular
coordination among citizens and, therefore, introduces a different perspective in understand-
ing the citizens’ decision to vote, which allows also to account for large shifts in turnout rates
that are observed after compulsory laws have been introduced or abolished. Moreover, this
set up proposes a theory for the D term used in rational theories of voting to account for
high turnout rates.
JEL classification: D72, C72
Keywords: Turnout, compulsory voting, Poisson games, coordination games, conformism.
1 Introduction and literature review
The act of voting is of crucial importance as it is the means by which decisions are made
in democracies. High turnout rates are considered desirable for many reasons, one of which
is the legitimation of the democracy itself. Understanding the motives behind individuals’
decision of voting is of tremendous relevance in the field of social sciences. The standard
rational choice approach (see Downs, 1957; Myerson, 1998, 2000; Palfrey and Rosenthal,
1985; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) produces a theory of voting in large populations that can
hardly explain the high turnout rates observed in the data: since it is extremely unlikely
that a voter can affect the electoral outcome, it is equally unlikely that, in equilibrium, the
voter is willing to pay the cost of participating to the election, unless he or she gains a direct
utility from it (the so called D term in Riker and Ordeshook (1968)) which is unrelated to
the instrumental benefit, i.e. the policy, that follows from the electoral outcome. 1 Therefore
it becomes crucial to understand the determinants of the term in the utility function that
affects the willingness to vote (see Aldrich, 1993), if we want to avoid to fall into the trap
of explaining any action “by making the appropriate assumptions post hoc” (Geys, 2006,
p. 19). 2
One justification for the existence of such a direct utility from voting comes from social
elements, such as peer pressure or norms for voting. To better understand their role and
power, we propose a model in which both pivot probabilities and social elements matter in
the individuals’ decision of voting. Citizens are motivated by the instrumental benefit from
the election plus a direct benefit coming from acting along with the majority of a properly
defined group. This second component of the utility function is defined as preference for
conformism. The choice between voting or not becomes the outcome of weighting the private
costs and benefits (which depend on the alternative that wins the election and the private
cost of voting) and the social ones (which depend on conforming to the choice chosen by the
majority). Contrary to models that assume an exogenous preference for the act of voting
1Rational choice theories of voting produce sensible predictions at the margin. It is well documented that
citizens are less likely to vote if the cost of voting increases, in election where there is little at stake and where
the expected margin is high. For a recent survey of rational choice models of voting, see Dhillon and Peralta
(2002); Geys (2006).
2An alternative model that generates high turnout is given by obtaining the minimax regret criterion (see
Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974). The idea of regrets if failing to vote has recently been adopted by Li and Dipjyoti
(2010).
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(i.e. D > 0), in this context, the act of voting does not generate, necessarily, a positive
utility. It does so only whenever the majority of the citizens vote. On the other hand, when
the majority of citizens decides to abstain, going to vote will generate a disutility from not
conforming.
As a result, the game so generated can have multiple equilibria: besides the low turnout
one, there are also others where turnout can be significantly high. A characterization of
these equilibria as a function of the intensity of the parameter governing the preference for
conformism, the distribution of the private cost of voting, the reference group affecting the
conformistic element of individuals’ utility and the asymmetry or the heterogeneity in the
parameter governing the preference for conformism is done. We find that multiple equilibria
arise when conformism is relatively important in the citizens’ preferences. Some of these
equilibria involve high turnout rates (i.e. more than 50%); depending on the cost distribution,
there can be multiple interior equilibria (i.e. where some vote and some abstain) with high
turnout rates when preference for conformism is intermediate; multiple equilibria are robust
with the introduction of asymmetry and heterogeneity in the preference for conformism and
with respect to the reference group for conformism.
In addition, our paper suggests that the turnout decision might be the solution of a coordi-
nation problem among individual citizens and that the way this coordination is solved might
depend on social factors, such as the reference group that determines turnout.
Finally our model offers some interesting comparative statics. Marginal changes in the cost
distributions might generate big changes in turnout rates by simply inducing voters to co-
ordinate on a different equilibrium. This implication of the model can explain the massive
decreases in turnout rates in all cases where mandatory voting laws were abolished. As it has
been observed (e.g. Jackman, 2001) mandatory voting laws acted as social norms in enforcing
high turnout rates. By imposing little or no penalties on the deviant, one can expect that
their abolishment cannot have affected the private cost of voting too much. However we
observe large shifts in turnout rates, which might be difficult to capture in a standard model
unless we have a big mass of marginal voters.
Multiple equilibria with high turnout rates were initially found by Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1983) in the standard pivot probability model, where citizens weigh the private cost and
benefit from voting. However multiple equilibria disappear as soon as some uncertainty about
fundamentals is introduced, and only the low turnout equilibrium remains. (Myerson, 1998,
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2000; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985) 3 On the other hand, in our model the existence of multiple
equilibria is due to the assumption that the aggregate behavior of citizens generates an
externality to the individual voter’s utility, and it is robust to the introduction of uncertainty
in all the parameters (private cost of voting and intensity of preference for conformism).
The role of social preferences in generating an externality in individuals’ utilities has a long
and established tradition in the social sciences (see, e.g. Akerlof, 1997; Becker, 1974; Gra-
novetter, 1978; Schelling, 1973, 1978). Also, the existence of multiple equilibria in a scenario
where individual utilities are affected by aggregative behavior is well known (see Brock and
Durlauf, 2001). 4 The contribution of our paper consists in analyzing such a setup in a pivot
probability turnout model.
Multiplicity of equilibria is also investigated in the recent bounded rationality model of
turnout, in which social dynamics are introduced to explain the possibility of convergence
(and therefore selection) towards high turnout rates (see DeMichelis and Dhillon, 2009; Dier-
meier and Mieghem, 2008). While DeMichelis and Dhillon (2009) consider an evolutionary
version of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983), the multiplicity of equilibria generated in Diermeier
and Mieghem (2008) is due to the existence of noisy public polls.
In recent attempts to rationalize higher levels of turnout, new approaches have been in-
troduced in which citizens have ethical preference (Coate and Conlin, 2004; Feddersen and
Sandroni, 2006). In these models, higher turnout rates are obtained because citizens act like
rule utilitarian in the sense that they choose to vote or not in order to maximize the utility
of a representative agent of their own group. Others have explored the role of altruism in
fostering high turnout rates: Fowler (2006) tests in laboratory setting the extent to which
altruism, in conjunction with party identification, can increase the propensity to vote. In
both these approaches, turnout is higher because citizens internalize other citizens’ benefit
from the electoral outcome. In our model instead, high turnout is due to the fact that citizens
internalize other citizens’ action.
3Castanheira (Castanheira) assesses the impact of other maintained assumptions of the rational choice
model, such as the electoral rule and the importance the mandate on the predicted levels of turnout.
4More recently, the literature on network games (see, e.g. Galeotti et al., 2010) has developed a framework
to analyze social interaction games. In addition, Breton and Weber (2009) provide Nash equilibria existence
result for a class of games where payoffs depend on three components: besides the intrinsic preference for the
action taken, and the conformity component, they also consider the possibility of dyadic externalities exerted
by peers. Manski (2000) provides a comprehensive overview of the economic analysis of social interactions.
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The interpretation of turnout as a social phenomenon or the role of conformism in contributing
to high voting rates is also widely proposed. Uhlaner (1986), for example, considers a model
in which citizens belong to groups within which they share the same view towards politics.
Group leaders will then mobilize their members towards the candidate they feel suites their
group’s needs the best. As a result, turnout rates are higher since group leaders can count
on mass of votes, which then have a higher impact on the pivot probabilities. 5
Coleman (2004) analyzes, in a decision theory framework, the effects of turnout induced by
a norm of civic duty in the choice of the particular candidate. Moreover Coleman (2004)
provides a wide discussion of the literature about conformism and voting. Of particular
interest is the evidence found (Blais, 2000) in cross country studies that a high share of the
adult population “believes that voting is a moral obligation and would feel guilty by not
voting” (Coleman, 2004, p. 78). Another element of interest is the evidence found (Knack,
1992) of a correlation between norm induced behaviors such as voting and giving to charities
or responding to census (op. cited in Coleman, 2004, p. 78). Similar correlations between a
norm for voting and a norm against littering have been found by Cialdini et al. (1990).
De Matos and Barros (2004) consider the role played by peer pressure in enforcing voting as
a norm of behavior, in a network based representation of social interactions, and show that
turnout can be the outcome of a contagion effect that starts from few highly motivated to
vote individuals.
In all these cases however the element of strategic interaction is not accounted for and there-
fore the possibility of norms which induce no equilibria is not discussed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic ingredients
of the model and provides the main existence result. Section 3 characterize the equilibria of
the game and analyzes the cases for multiplicity, while Section 4 provides few examples for
different cost distributions. Sections 5 through 7 analyze the robustness of the results with
respect to different reference group for conformism, asymmetric preferences for conformism,
and heterogeneity in the preference for conformism. Last, Section 8 discusses an interpreta-
tion of mandatory voting laws as a coordinating device, and Section 9 concludes the paper.
Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
5Morton (1991) formalizes a rational choice model of turnout in which the behavior of groups is incorporated
and shows that when positive turnout is observed, it will typically be higher than in the standard case.
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2 The turnout model
Consider a large population of citizens who need to choose, via majority voting, between two
exogenously given alternatives, R and L. The population is partitioned into two groups, one
that prefers R to L (call them group R citizens) and one that prefers L to R (call them group
L citizens). The utility received by citizens is set to 1 if their most preferred alternative is
selected, or 0 if their least preferred alternative is selected. Voting is a costly activity. Let the
cost of voting, c, be distributed over the interval [0, 1] according to a continuous distribution
F (c) which admits density f(c). Note that this specification of the cost distribution does not
allow for any mass of voters with strictly negative costs. Hence there are no citizens that
vote or abstain unconditionally.
In addition, citizens are endowed with a preference for conformism, in the sense that they
gain utility any time they choose the same action (vote or not) of the majority of a reference
group. We consider first the case where people care about the action taken by all the other
citizens (population wide conformism). Later in the paper (section 5) we consider the other
polar case where people care only about the action taken by their own group’s members
(group based conformism).
Each citizen simultaneously chooses whether to vote for R, or L or to stay home (abstain).
The alternative that receives the majority of the votes is selected. A flip of a coin is used to
break ties (so that eventually each alternative is equally likely to be selected).
Since there are only two alternatives, voting for the most preferred one weakly dominates
the choice of voting for the least preferred. Therefore we can reduce the citizens’ problem to
either vote for the most preferred alternative or stay home. The payoff table can be simplified
as follows:
WIN LOSE
V OTE 1− c+ δx −c+ δx
ABSTAIN 1 + δ(1− x) δ(1− x)
.
where δ > 0 denotes the relative importance of conformism and x denotes the share of citizens
in the population who choose to vote. This specification is without loss of generality as it
allows also for a utility that is a convex combination between the voting outcome and the
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choice of the other citizens.
The change in expected utility due to voting is given by the following equation
∆EU = ∆P − c− δ(1− 2x)
where ∆P is the increase in the probability of winning induced by voting. Note that ∆P is
non zero only when the voter is pivotal to the election. So its computation boils down to
the calculation of the probability that the voter is pivotal, which is quite a small number for
large elections.
Following Myerson (1998, 2000), the population size is uncertain and distributed according
to a Poisson process with mean n, where n is a finite but large integer. Each citizen belongs
to group R with probability θ. As we will see shortly, the use of a Poisson game allows for a
tractable approximation of these pivot probabilities.
In this scenario a strategy can be simplified into a cutoff rule, c¯j , j = R,L so that citizen i
in group j with private cost cij votes if and only if cij ≤ c¯j . By imposing the same cutoffs
within each group, we are restricting our attention to semi-symmetric strategies.
An interior equilibrium is represented by a pair of cutoffs (c¯R, c¯L) for which
PR(ρ, λ, θ, n) = c¯R + δ [1− 2θρ− 2(1− θ)λ] (1)
PL(ρ, λ, θ, n) = c¯L + δ [1− 2θρ− 2(1− θ)λ] (2)
and ρ = F (c¯R), λ = F (c¯L), where PR(·), PL(·) denote the probabilities that a group R, L,
citizen is pivotal to the election.
Furthermore, cutoffs can be at a corner (so that either nobody or everybody vote). In that
case the equilibrium condition becomes one of the following
PR(0, λ, θ, n) ≤ δ [1− 2(1− θ)λ] (3)
PL(ρ, 0, θ, n) ≤ δ [1− 2θρ] (4)
PR(1, λ, θ, n) ≥ 1 + δ [1− 2θ − 2(1− θ)λ] (5)
PL(ρ, 1, θ, n) ≥ 1 + δ [2θ(1− ρ)− 1] (6)
Note that the role of preferences for conformism is to (endogenously) increase or decrease
the cost of voting. We should therefore expect that the voting game might have multiple
equilibria: when there is enough mass of citizens who chose to vote, and the preference for
conformism is sufficiently strong, more find it optimal to turn out. Hence a high turnout
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equilibrium should be expected. When, on the other hand, the expectation is that few will
vote, then in equilibrium very few or even nobody will vote, depending on how strong the
preference for conformism is.
Since ties are broken via a flip of a coin, a player’s vote matters when it allows to force a
winning tie, or to break a losing tie. Therefore the pivot probabilities of the Poisson game
are given by
PR(ρ, λ, θ, n) =
1
2
∞∑
k=0
e−ρθn(ρθn)k
k!
e−λ(1−θ)n(λ(1− θ)n)k
k!
[
1 +
λ(1− θ)n
k + 1
]
=
1
2
e−n(ρθ+λ(1−θ))
[
I0(2n
√
ρλθ(1− θ)) +
√
λ(1− θ)
ρθ
I1(2n
√
ρλθ(1− θ))
]
(7)
and
PL(ρ, λ, θ, n) =
1
2
∞∑
k=0
e−ρθn(ρθn)k
k!
e−λ(1−θ)n(λ(1− θ)n)k
k!
[
1 +
ρθn
k + 1
]
=
1
2
e−n(ρθ+λ(1−θ))
[
I0(2n
√
ρλθ(1− θ)) +
√
ρθ
λ(1− θ)I1(2n
√
ρλθ(1− θ))
]
(8)
where Ia(b) denotes a modified Bessel function of the first order of parameters a and b (Abramowitz
and Stegun, 1965). Note that when ρ = λ = 0 these equations boil down to 1/2.
We can provide an equilibrium existence result, for any θ ∈ (0, 1) and δ ≥ 0, by means of a
standard fixed point argument.
Proposition 1. There exists at least one equilibrium in cutoff points (c¯R, c¯L) for any value
of δ ≥ 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1).
It is now of interest to characterize the equilibria of the game as a function of δ and the cost
distribution F (c).
3 Equilibrium Analysis
The characterization of the equilibria as a function of δ and F (c) proceeds along the following
lines: first corner equilibria are analyzed for any value of θ and any continuous cost distribu-
tion; then existence and uniqueness of interior equilibria are studied, under the assumption
of θ = 1/2 and F (c) is C1 over (0, 1). As it turns out, the choice of θ = 1/2 allows us to
characterize the equilibria by means of graphical analysis, once F (c) is specified.
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Proposition 2. The corner equilibrium (0, 0) exists if and only if δ ≥ 1/2. The corner
equilibrium (1, 1) exists if and only if δ ≥ 1− Pj(1, 1, θ, n) for all j.
In addition, when θ = 1/2 there are no other corner equilibria.
Proposition 2 establishes the cutoffs values of δ for which full abstention and full turnout
are equilibria. As the preference for conformism is positively correlated with the incentives
coming from the pivot probability at low turnout rates, the full abstention equilibrium arises
for small values of δ. Much higher preference for conformism is needed to overcome the
incentive coming from the low pivot probability to induce a full turnout equilibrium.
We now focus on the study of the interior equilibria. We are able to show that, depending on
the values of δ, we might have either an odd (and possibly unique) or an even (and possibly
zero) number of interior equilibria. As stated, we restrict our analysis to the case of θ = 1/2
and we pose the restriction that F (c) is C1 in (0, 1). Write cm to indicate the median of
F (c), i.e. that value of c for which F (c) = 1/2, and M to indicate the peak (or mode) of
f(c), whenever it exists. If the distribution has more than one mode, we let M indicate the
global maximizer of f(c). Note that, by definition of p.d.f., it follows that f(M) ≥ 1.
The first result shows that the interior equilibria of the game are symmetric when θ = 1/2.
Proposition 3. When θ = 1/2, all the equilibria of the game are symmetric, i.e. c¯j = c for
all j.
Proposition 3 implies that the equilibria of the game can be characterized by studying the
equation
Pj(F (c), F (c), 1/2, n) = c+ δ(1− 2F (c)) (9)
as c and δ vary. By evaluating the equation for the pivot probability at θ = 1/2 and
λ = ρ = F (c), we then get
l(c) ≡ e
−nF (c)
2
[I0(nF (c)) + I1(nF (c))] = c+ δ [1− 2F (c)] ≡ r(c) (10)
The following characterization of the number of interior equilibria applies.
Proposition 4. Let Ω = {δ ∈ R+| δ ≤ 1/2 ∪ δ ≥ 1− (2npi)−1/2}. There exists (generically)
an odd number of interior equilibria if and only if δ ∈ Ω.
There exists (generically) an even number of interior equilibria, and possibly zero, if and only
if δ ∈ R+ \ Ω.
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Observe that when θ = 1/2, P (1, 1, 1/2, n) ≈ (2npi)−1/2 (see equations (A-7) and (A-8) in
the Appendix). Thus this value of θ sets the lower bound of the corner equilibrium (1, 1) to
exist. Proposition 4 tells us that the number of interior equilibria just depends on whether
the corner equilibria (0, 0) and (1, 1) exist.
In addition, when δ is sufficiently small there is only one interior equilibrium, which is asso-
ciated to a low turnout.
Proposition 5. Suppose θ = 1/2 and f(c) <∞ for all c ∈ [0, 1]. There exists a unique inte-
rior equilibrium whenever δ < [2f(M)]−1. If in addition n > [pic2m]−1 the unique equilibrium
induces a turnout rate which is below 50% and which decreases with δ.
The condition on n is needed to ensure that the cutoff is to the left of the median. However
it is quite mild. When, for example, the cost distribution has a median equal to 0.01, we just
need a population of size at least 318,310 for the inequality to hold.
Proposition 5 allows us to tell even more: since the equilibrium cutoff c is a continuous
function of δ, and since it decreases with δ, we know that for values of δ, equilibrium turnout
rates are even lower than when conformism does not matter. As δ approaches 1/2, the low
turnout equilibrium c approaches 0, i.e. the extreme case where nobody votes. This is not
surprising: when conformism does not matter (i.e. δ = 0), citizens vote with very small
probability because the chance they affect the outcome is virtually zero. As conformism
starts to kick in, this effect is reinforced and therefore turnout decreases further up to the
point where everybody stays home (δ ≥ 1/2).
Note also that f(M) < ∞ is sufficient but not necessary for an interior equilibrium, as the
example in Proposition 8 shows. Finally note that as a corollary we have that a necessary
condition for high turnout equilibria to arise is that δ > [2f(M)]−1.
Moving on, for sufficiently large δ other equilibria appears. Since when θ = 1/2, P (1, 1, 1/2, n) ≈
(2npi)−1/2, we know that when δ ≥ 1− (2pin)−1/2 there is a corner equilibrium where every-
body votes (Proposition 2), and that there is also at least one interior equilibrium (Propo-
sition 4). We now show that for sufficiently large n this equilibrium has high turnout, since
the cutoff value is larger than the median, i.e. c > cm.
Proposition 6. Suppose θ = 1/2, δ ≥ 1− (2pin)−1/2 and n > [pic2m]−1. There exists at least
one interior equilibrium whose turnout rate is higher than 50%. In addition, the smallest and
the largest of these equilibria generates a turnout rate that decreases with δ.
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Proposition 6 implies that we can always find a sufficiently large δ, after which there is always
a unique interior equilibrium.
To wrap things up we have found that: for low values of δ a unique equilibrium with low
turnout is observed. This result maps the standard pivot probability model (which corre-
sponds to δ = 0 in our case) where low turnout is observed, and is reinforced by the preference
for conformism. As δ increases such a reinforcement effect becomes stronger and therefore
an equilibrium whereby no one votes is also present. However, equilibria where a significant
fraction of the population vote now tend to appear, along with the one where everybody
votes. Hence high turnout equilibria require a sufficiently large weight on the preference for
conformism. Note that such a large weight on the presence of conformism also implies that
a no vote equilibrium is also possible.
Because of this multiplicity, which equilibrium is eventually selected becomes then crucial for
predicting the correct level of turnout. This question is specifically analyzed in a companion
paper (Landi and Sodini, 2010). In the following sections, instead, we focus on the equilibrium
characterization for specific specifications of the cost distribution (Section 4) and on the
analysis of robustness of our results with respect to changes in parametrization of the model.
As we shall see, multiple equilibria with high turnout rates are still observable.
4 Some examples
Our analysis shows that a full characterization of the interior equilibria can be done via
simple study of the functions l(c) and r(c) in equation (10) whose specific form depends on
the the parametrization of F (c). In this section we provide some examples.
Suppose first that costs are uniformly distributed, so that F (c) = c. We have that l(c) is
decreasing and convex, while r(c) is linear. In fact,
r(c) = c(1− 2δ) + δ
Thus r(c) is strictly increasing for any δ < 1/2, flat at δ = 1/2, and strictly decreasing for
any δ > 1/2. The equilibria of the voting game can be characterized by inspecting figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here.]
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The red lines indicate r(c) for values of δ ≤ 1/2 while the dashed blue lines indicate r(c)
for values of δ > 1/2. Under this configuration of costs we always get either a unique
interior equilibrium, or no interior equilibria. The following proposition summarizes the
characterization of the equilibria of the game.
Proposition 7. Suppose θ = 1/2 and F (c) = c. There is a unique interior equilibrium
(, cL), with cL < 1/2 for δ < 1/2. There is a unique corner equilibrium (0, 0) for δ ∈
[1/2, 1− (2pin)−1/2). There are two corner equilibria, (0, 0) and (1, 1), and a unique interior
equilibrium (cH , cH), with cH > cm for δ ≥ 1− (2pin)−1/2.
Things are similar when costs are given by F (c) = ck with k ≥ 2. In this case we have that
M = 1 and f(M) = k, therefore r(c) is convex and strictly increasing for δ < (2k)−1 and
with a unique interior maximum otherwise. In fact,
r(c) = c+ δ(1− 2ck)
and the interior maximum is given by
c? =
(
1
2kδ
) 1
k−1
On the other hand, l(c) has an inflexion point. Figure 2 allows to provide the characterization
of the equilibria.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The red curves indicate r(c) for δ < 1/2, whereas the dashed blue curves indicate r(c) for δ >
1/2. Again, there is at most a unique interior equilibrium and the complete characterization
follows Proposition 7
Multiple interior equilibria do appear when the cost distribution is strictly concave, at least
locally. Suppose for example that costs are distributed according to a power distribution with
parameters 1 and 1/k, so that F (c) = c1/k, with k ≥ 2. We still have that l(c) is decreasing
and convex, whereas now r(c) is concave and has an interior minimum. In fact
r(c) = c+ δ(1− 2c1/k)
and the interior minimum is given by
c? =
(
2δ
k
) k
k−1
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Note that M = 0 and f(c) is discontinuous at the origin. Therefore there are no values of
δ ≥ 0 for which r(c) is strictly increasing. Under this configuration of costs we have one, two,
three, or no interior equilibria. The equilibria of the game can be characterized by looking
at figure 3
[Figure 3 about here.]
The black curve represents l(c). It starts at 1/2 and decreases monotonically. The red curves
represent r(c) for values of δ less than 1/2 while the dashed blue curves represent r(c) for
values of δ larger than 1/2. First observe that given the parameter specifications we have
that npi > c−2m . The low turnout equilibrium decreases with δ as can be seen by looking
at the red curves. Interestingly enough multiple high turnout equilibria arise even when
δ < 1/2. Finally when δ > 1− (2npi)−1/2 (see the two lowest of the blue curves) we have only
one interior equilibrium which again decreases with δ. The following proposition reports the
complete characterization of the equilibria.
Proposition 8. Suppose θ = 1/2 and F (c) = c1/k, with k ≥ 2. There is a unique interior
equilibrium (cL, cL), with cL < cm for δ ∈ [0, δ1) with δ1 < 1/2. There are three interior
equilibria, (cL, cL), (cH1, cH1), and (cH2, cH2), with cL < cm < cH1 < cH2 for δ ∈ (δ1, 1/2).
There are two interior equilibria, (cH1, cH1), and (cH2, cH2), with cH2 > cH1 > cm and
a corner equilibrium (0, 0) for δ ∈ (1/2, 1 − (2pin)−1/2). There is one interior equilibrium
(cH , cH), with cH > cm and two corner equilibria, (0, 0) and (1, 1) for δ ≥ 1− (2pin)−1/2.
Another concave cost distribution is given by F (c) = 1 − (1 − c)k with k ≥ 2. 6 Figure 4
reports the plots of l(c) and r(c) as a function of δ.
[Figure 4 about here.]
We see a similar pattern with two main differences. First, for intermediate values of δ it
is possible that no interior equilibria arise. Second, interior high turnout equilibria cannot
coexist with interior low turnout ones.
Proposition 9. Suppose θ = 1/2 and F (c) = 1 − (1 − c)k, with k ≥ 2. There is a
unique interior equilibrium (cL, cL), with cL < cm for δ < 1/2. There is only a corner
equilibrium (0, 0) for δ ∈ [1/2, δ1), with δ1 < 1− (2pin)−1/2. There are two interior equilibria
6This is the parametrization used in Landi and Sodini (2010).
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(cH1, cH1) and (cH2, cH2), with cH2 > cH1 > cm and a corner equilibrium (0, 0) for δ ∈
(δ1, 1 − (2pin)−1/2). There is a unique interior equilibrium (cH , cH), with cH > cm and two
corner equilibria (0, 0) and (1, 1) for δ ≥ 1− (2pin)−1/2.
Finally we look at bimodal distributions. Consider two Beta distributions with mode sym-
metrically distributed about 1/2 and sufficiently distant. If we take a simple average of the
two we obtain a bimodal distribution. Figure 5 reports the equilibria when the modes are
given by M1 = 0.1 and M2 = 0.9.
[Figure 5 about here.]
From the above examples we observe a pattern. A necessary condition condition for multiple
interior equilibria is that the cost distribution is concave at least locally. In addition, whether
the cost distribution is single peaked might not affect much the pattern of the interior equi-
libria. This is an interesting feature of the model, because smooth distributions associated
to costs that are mainly small are strictly concave. Hence, multiple equilibria should be
expected to be the norm whenever costs are small.
We now consider another possible extension of the model, in which conformism is group
based, in the sense that it depends on the choice made by the majority of the citizens within
the same group. We obtain the same characterization of the interior equilibria, but now some
more corner equilibria appear.
5 Groups’ related conformism
When players care only about the voting decision of their own group, the cutoff equilibrium
costs are obtained from
PR(ρ, λ, θ, n) = c¯R + δ [1− 2ρ] (11)
PL(ρ, λ, θ, n) = c¯L + δ [1− 2λ] (12)
where ρ = F (c¯R) and λ = F (c¯L). (Note how now the above conditions do not depend of
θ.) We can parallel the logic in the proof of Proposition 3: by taking the ratio between
equations (11) and (12) we obtain√
F (c¯L)
F (c¯R)
=
c¯R + δ [1− 2F (c¯R)]
c¯L + δ [1− 2F (c¯L)]
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Thus a unique interior symmetric solution is c¯R = c¯L = c and the interior equilibria are still
characterized by studying the equation (9). Therefore the interior equilibria are the same as
with population wide conformism.
However in this simple set up, the two models differ in the type of corner equilibria they
generate. In fact, with group based conformism we have many more of them, as summarized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 10. If conformism depends on the behavior of one player’s group, all the
corner equilibria (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (1, 1) are possible for suitable parameter values.
Side equilibria of the form (0, λ), (ρ, 0), (1, λ) and (ρ, 1) are also possible.
Few comments are in order. As the interior solutions are obtained from conditions (11)
and (12), we see that they do not depend on θ. Yet when conformism is population wide,
the interior equilibria do depend on θ. Therefore the equivalence of the set of the interior
equilibria with two different types of conformism depends crucially on the assumption about
θ = 1/2. 7
Moreover, new corner equilibria arise because when conformism is group based the trade off
between conformism and free riding on own members is weaker. In fact, when preference for
conformism is sufficiently strong, pivot probability considerations become irrelevant relative
to acting according to the majority of one’s own group.
We now proceed into analyzing the role of δ. We first consider the importance of having
a symmetric δ (i.e. citizens are neutral to their choice of voting or not with respect to
conformism), and then consider the role of homogeneous δ for our results.
6 Asymmetric values for δ
Suppose that conformism is asymmetrically perceived when voting and when not voting. In
other words, we consider a scenario in which δ1 denotes the weight given to conformism
when voting and δ0 6= δ1 denotes the weight given to conformism when not voting. When
conformism is population wide, a voter supporting candidate j, with private cost i, votes if
7By simulating the equilibria for a particular cost function in large electorate, we find that they do not
change much with θ (Landi and Sodini, 2010).
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and only if
Pj(ρ, λ, 1/2, n) ≥ ci + δ0 − (δ0 + δ1)ρ+ λ
2
In this setup, symmetry of the cutoffs across groups still holds, and the interior equilibria are
characterized by studying the equation
Pj(F (c), F (c), 1/2, n) = c+ δ0 − (δ0 + δ1)F (c)
whereas corner equilibria are obtained from the conditions
PR(0, λ, 1/2, n) ≤ δ0 − (δ0 + δ1)λ
2
(13)
PL(ρ, 0, 1/2, n) ≤ δ0 − (δ0 + δ1)ρ
2
(14)
PR(1, λ, 1/2, n) ≥ 1 + δ0 − (δ0 + δ1)1 + λ
2
(15)
PL(ρ, 1, 1/2, n) ≥ 1 + δ0 − (δ0 + δ1)1 + ρ
2
(16)
The following results are a straightforward consequence of the analysis done in the base model
with symmetric δ:
Proposition 11. The corner equilibrium (0, 0) exists if and only if δ0 ≥ 1/2;
The corner equilibrium (1, 1) exists if and only if δ1 ≥ 1− (2npi)−1/2.
Proposition 11 shows that corner equilibria do not depend on the relative distance between
δ0 and δ1. In fact, since these equilibria are computed by comparing the marginal cost and
marginal benefit of voting at the extremes (i.e. c = 0 and c = 1), it is only the conformism
parameter governing the respective action (i.e. voting or not) that matters.
As a result, there can be parameter configurations for which none of the two exist, only one
of the two exist, or both exist. These cases in turn affect the characterization of the interior
equilibria. Specifically:
Proposition 12. Suppose that δ0 ≥ 1/2 and δ1 ≥ 1 − (2npi)−1/2. There are two corner
equilibria, (0, 0) and (1, 1) and (generically) an odd number of interior equilibria.
Suppose that δ0 < 1/2 and δ1 ≥ 1− (2npi)−1/2. There exist a corner equilibrium, (1, 1), and
(generically) an even, and possibly zero, number of interior equilibria.
Suppose that δ0 ≥ 1/2 and δ1 < 1− (2npi)−1/2. There exist a corner equilibrium, (0, 0), and
(generically) an even, and possibly zero, number number of interior equilibria. In addition,
15
there are no interior equilibria whenever, F (c) is strictly concave or f(c) <∞ for all c ∈ [0, 1]
and
δ0 + δ1 < min
{
1,
1
f(M)
}
Finally, suppose that δ0 < 1/2 and δ1 < 1 − (2npi)−1/2. There are no corner equilibria and
(generically) an odd number of interior equilibria. In addition, the interior equilibrium is
unique whenever f(c) <∞ for all c ∈ [0, 1], and
δ0 + δ1 < min
{
1,
1
f(M)
}
Proposition 12 shows that multiplicity of equilibria remains an issue, because it follows from
the externality of other citizens’ actions into individual’s utilities.
7 A smooth distribution of δ
So far we have assumed that society shares the same value for conformism. In this section
we introduce incomplete information (i.e. heterogeneity) with respect to the parameter δ.
One might consider heterogeneity of preference for conformism as a more realistic assumption,
since it is quite unlikely that citizens agree on the level by which conformism matters. There
are also some advantages of introducing a distribution for the parameter δ into the model:
it is possible to verify the robustness of the multiplicity of equilibria with respect to the
asymmetry of information in the underlying parameters of the model, just like in Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1983, 1985). In addition, it allows to do comparative statics on the voting
decisions with respect to the distribution of cohesiveness in societies.
Suppose that preference for conformism δ is distributed according to the continuous func-
tion Fδ(δ) with support [0, δˆ]. Suppose that the private cost c is distributed according to
the continuous distribution Fc(c) with support [o, cˆ]. To make the problem interesting let
min{cˆ, δˆ} > 1/2. Last assume that both distributions are independent. Let fδ(δ) and fc(c)
denote the respective densities. Now players are characterized by the triplet (j, k, h) indicat-
ing the alternative they prefer, their intensity of preference for conformism and their private
cost of voting. A strategy is a function from this triple into the voting or not voting decision.
Equilibria will be characterized by cutoffs (cj , δj) such that voters below the cutoffs vote and
voters above the cutoff abstain.
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Since c and δ are drawn from the the same distributions for all players, and θ = 1/2, the sym-
metric interior equilibrium requires cutoffs to be the same for supporters of both alternatives
and can be obtained as the solution of the equation
PR(λ, λ, 1/2, n) = c+ δ(1− 2λ) (17)
where λ is the share of voters, and it is obtained as the solution of the following fixed point
problem
Probc,δ [c+ δ(1− 2λ) ≤ PR(λ, λ, 1/2, n)] = λ (18)
To ease on notation we write P (λ, n) to denote PR(λ, λ, 1/2, n). Let l(λ) denote the left hand
side of equation (18). Note that l(λ) is a continuous function of λ, such that
l(0) = Probc,δ(c+ δ ≤ 1/2) > 0
and
l(1) = Probc,δ(c− δ ≤ P (1, n)) ≈
∫ δˆ
0
Fc
(
c ≤ 1√
2npi
+ δ
)
fδ(δ)dδ < 1
where the second equality follows from the approximations of the pivot probabilities. This
suffices to establish existence of one fixed point. We have therefore that
Proposition 13. Assume conformism is population wide, and citizens differ in their private
cost of voting and intensity of preference for conformism. When c and δ are independently
distributed, there exists at least one interior equilibrium.
Note in particular that
l(1/2) = Fc (P (1/2, n)) <
1
2
whenever the median cost, cm, is larger than P (1/2, n) =
e−n/2
2 [I0(n/2) + I1(n/2)]. Therefore
we have that
Proposition 14. For any distribution of the cost, Fc(c) and of the intensity of preference
for conformism, Fδ(δ), we can find a sufficiently large n for which an interior equilibrium
exists at low level of turnout, i.e. for which λ < 1/2.
Note also that the condition on the population’s size depends only on the specific functional
form for the distribution of the cost.
Other equilibria with high turnout can arise in this setting, as the following examples show.
To start with, consider the case where both costs and preference for conformism are uniformly
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distributed. While costs are kept between 0 and 1, the preference for conformism ranges from
0 to ∆. Intuitively, the larger ∆ the more likely it should be to have multiple equilibria. We
are interested in the lower bound on ∆ for which multiple interior equilibria arise.
Proposition 15. Suppose that Fc(c) = c, c ∈ [0, 1], and Fδ(δ) = δ/∆, δ ∈ [0,∆]. There are
two interior equilibria with high turnout if and only if ∆ > 4(1− P (3/4, n))2.
A similar result can be obtained when when costs are mainly small and preference for con-
formism is mainly large. We can see that by adopting a right skewed triangular distribution
for the cost, and a (left skewed) power distribution, between 0 and 2, for the preference for
conformism.
Proposition 16. Suppose Fc(c) = c(2 − c), c ∈ [0, 1], and Fδ(δ) = δ2/4, with δ ∈ [0, 2].
There are two interior high turnout equilibria.
To wrap up, multiplicity of equilibria is not fragile to the introduction of uncertainty about
the preference for conformism.
8 Discussion
In this paper we have characterized the equilibria of a voting model where agents care about
others’ choices. We have shown that for some parameter specifications we have multiplicity
of equilibria, which in turn create a coordination problem. In a companion work (Landi
and Sodini, 2010) we try to address such an issue from the point of view of evolutionary
dynamics. However in this section we want to briefly discuss of our findings in light of the
data on turnout.
Quite few countries adopt or adopted compulsory voting (henceforth CV) laws. By estab-
lishing a set of penalties for non compliance and/or by setting up procedures to ease the act
of voting, these laws de facto reduce the individual cost of voting. According to cost benefit
analysis, we should expect an increase in turnout rates when CV laws are introduced, and a
decrease in turnout rates when these laws are abolished.
Indeed, there is evidence of positive correlations between turnout rates and introduction of
CV laws and voters’ turnout, and of negative correlation between abolishment of CV laws
and voters’ turnout (Jackman, 2001). However, the magnitude of these effects is quite big.
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For example, after abolishing CV law, average turnout fell from 91.40% to 82.93% in Italy,
from 94.70% to 81.34% in the Netherlands and from 86.37% to 44.82% in Venezuela. 8 Even
more, turnout rates when CV laws are present dominate turnout rates when CV laws are
abolished. The minimum turnout rates when CV laws were present are, respectively, 87.44%,
93.12%, and 60.00%, while maximum turnout rates after CV laws have been abolished are,
respectively, 86.14%, 88.00%, and 56.55%. These figures are quite striking, in light of the
fact that in almost all cases CV laws put no or purely symbolic penalties for non compliance,
if they are mentioned at all. Therefore, to be able to match these numbers with a cost of
voting model, we always need a big mass of marginal voters.
While this is definitely an interesting empirical question, we want to suggest a further expla-
nation of this correlation: CV laws act as a coordinating device, a norm that allows citizens to
coordinate towards the higher turnout equilibrium. Such laws, in fact, might be the expres-
sion of a majority that considers the act of voting as important and valuable and by putting
this in black and white they generate the right coordinating device. As others (Jackman,
2001) have already noticed, a CV law may act as a social norm in some countries such as
Italy, where “social embarrassment [is] an important sanction for non-compliance.” A further
motive to prefer this interpretation of the act of voting comes from the evidence that most
of the penalties applied to non voters are smaller than a parking ticket violation. However
we observe much more compliance with CV laws. This seems to corroborate the hypothesis
that something else, besides the comparison at the margin of private cost and private ben-
efit, is taken into account when deciding whether to vote. Something that can be framed
within norm dictated behavior, and that we have studied in this paper, the preference for
conformism.
9 Conclusion
This paper presents an alternative model of turnout where citizens have preference for con-
formism. If conformism plays a non marginal role in citizens’ utilities, the voting game has
multiple equilibria, and high turnout rates are observable. This result is robust with respect
to the uncertainty underlying the cost of voting and the asymmetry and heterogeneity of the
8Authors’ own calculations from turnout data available at http://www.idea.int.
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parameter governing the preference for conformism.
In this model, turnout is interpreted as the solution of two types of coordination problems:
one, which is standard, is due by the tendency of citizens who prefer the same alternative to
free ride on others’ efforts, which pushes turnout rates down. The other, with the population
at large (but not necessarily so) whereby others’ actions directly influence one’s utility. This
may reinforce the low willingness to vote if there is an expectation that the others will stay
home, but may also counteract it if there is an expectation that others will turn out.
Different degrees of preferences for conformism will potentially induce different turnout rates.
Yet, it is still possible to observe different turnout rates for the same level of preference for
conformism, depending on how the equilibrium selection is solved. Multiplicity of equilibria
can also be used to explain the high jumps in voter turnout that we observe after compulsory
voting laws were abolished, as these laws can be interpreted as a coordinating device that
help citizen to pick the right norm of behavior.
Our paper shows that for given intensity for conformism, high turnout equilibria are more
likely to emerge when the reference group for conformism is more homogeneous. The next
step on the research agenda is to deepen the role played by more structured network relations
into the voting or not choice.
20
A Pivot probabilities
This is another way to write the pivot probabilities. It becomes useful when looking at corner
equilibria:
PR(ρ, λ, θ, n) =
1
2
e−n(ρθ+λ(1−θ)) [1 + λ(1− θ)n] +
+
1
2
∞∑
k=1
e−ρθn(ρθn)k
k!
e−λ(1−θ)n(λ(1− θ)n)k
k!
[
1 +
λ(1− θ)n
k + 1
]
(A-1)
and
PL(ρ, λ, θ, n) =
1
2
e−n(ρθ+λ(1−θ)) [1 + ρθn] +
1
2
∞∑
k=0
e−ρθn(ρθn)k
k!
e−λ(1−θ)n(λ(1− θ)n)k
k!
[
1 +
ρθn
k + 1
]
(A-2)
Based on equations (A-1) and (A-2) we can easily get
PR(0, λ, θ, n) =
1
2
e−nλ(1−θ) [1 + λ(1− θ)n] (A-3)
PL(0, λ, θ, n) =
1
2
e−nλ(1−θ) (A-4)
PR(ρ, 0, θ, n) =
1
2
e−nρθ (A-5)
PL(ρ, 0, θ, n) =
1
2
e−nλ(1−θ) [1 + ρθn] (A-6)
On the other hand, the pivot probabilities can be approximated to obtain (Abramowitz and
Stegun, 1965; Myerson, 1998)
PR(ρ, λ, θ, n) ≈ e
−n(√θρ−
√
(1−θ)λ)2
4
√
npi
√
θ(1− θ)λρ
√
θρ+
√
(1− θ)λ√
θρ
(A-7)
PL(ρ, λ, θ, n) ≈ e
−n(√θρ−
√
(1−θ)λ)2
4
√
npi
√
θ(1− θ)λρ
√
θρ+
√
(1− θ)λ√
(1− θ)λ (A-8)
These approximations allow us to conclude that
PR(ρ, λ, θ, n) = PL(ρ, λ, θ, n)
√
(1− θ)λ
θρ
This relation is useful when considering the other type of corner equilibria, since
PR(1, λ, θ, n) =
√
(1− θ)λ
θ
PL(1, λ, θ, n) (A-9)
PL(ρ, 1, θ, n) =
√
θρ
1− θPR(ρ, 1, θ, n) (A-10)
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B Bessel functions
The asymptotic results about pivot probabilities are computed by Myerson. Yet in the
application at hand, they can be obtained by using modified Bessel functions. As those
probabilities depend also on the tie breaking rule, which I assumed to be a flip of a fair coin,
it is important to have an understanding of how these Bessel functions works, in case the tie
breaking rule were to be changed, given the application at hand.
A modified Bessel function I of degree v is defined as
Iv(z) =
(
1
2
z
)v ∞∑
k=0
(
1
4z
2
)k
k!(k + v)!
which, for fixed v z is sufficiently large (see Abramowitz and Stegun, 1965; Castanheira,
Castanheira; Myerson, 2000) can be approximated by
Iv(z) ≈ e
z
√
2piz
This is the starting point for the computation of pivot probabilities. In fact, in a Poisson
game, the probability that candidate 1 is ahead of exactly v votes is given by
Prob(v1 = v2 + v) =
∞∑
k=0
e−r1rk+v1
(k + v)!
· e
−r2rk2
k!
where ri depends on the parameter of the Poisson distribution and the strategy of the players.
After some algebra manipulation this becomes
Prob(v1 = v2 + v) = e
−(r1+r2)
(
r1
r2
)v/2
(
√
r1r2)
v
∞∑
k=0
(√
r1r2
)2k
k!(k + v)!
and the relation with a Bessel modified function becomes transparent, once we let z = 2
√
r1r2.
As a result the probability that candidate 1 is ahead of exactly v votes for large populations
is approximated by
Prob(v1 = v2 + v) ≈ e
−(√r1−√r2)2
2
√
pi
√
r1r2
(√
r1
r2
)v
By similar calculations we can see that the probability that candidate 2 is ahead of exactly
w votes is approximately given by
Prob(v2 = v1 + w) ≈ e
−(√r1−√r2)2
2
√
pi
√
r1r2
(√
r2
r1
)v
When ties are broken via a flip of a coin, candidate i’s voter is pivotal any time her vote
breaks a losing tie or forces a winning tie. This requires candidate i tieing or trailing by one
vote.
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Therefore, the probability that candidate 1’s voter is pivotal, P1, is the average of the prob-
ability of having a tie between the two candidates (w = 0) and the probability of candidate
2 being one vote ahead w = 1. Thus
P1 ≈ e
−(√r1+√r2)2
4
√
pi
√
r1r2
(
1 +
√
r2
r1
)
Similarly, the probability of candidate 2’s voter being pivotal, P2, is given by
P2 ≈ e
−(√r1+√r2)2
4
√
pi
√
r1r2
(
1 +
√
r1
r2
)
Remark that
P1
P2
=
√
r2
r1
If ties were solved differently, these equations would change. Suppose for example that
candidate 1 represents the status quo which can be overturn only by a majority of votes
against, then a candidate 1’s voter is pivotal any time candidate 1 is trailing by one vote
(w = 1). Therefore the pivot probability is just
P˜1 ≈ e
−(√r1−√r2)2
2
√
pi
√
r1r2
√
r2
r1
On the other hand, a candidate 2’s voter is pivotal any time there is a tie between the two
candidates (v = 0). Therefore the pivot probability is just
P˜2 ≈ e
−(√r1−√r2)2
2
√
pi
√
r1r2
Note that, again, the ratio of these two probabilities is unchanged as
P˜1
P˜2
=
√
r2
r1
Therefore the equilibrium relations between r1 and r2 should not depend on the particular
tie breaking rule. This is the sense of the comment found in the literature about the fact
that there is no loss in generality in assuming a random tie breaking rule.
The following are useful properties of Bessel functions of the first order which are reported
or can be derived from (Abramowitz and Stegun, 1965, pages 375, 377):
1. I−n(x) = In(x)
2. dI0(x)dx = I1(x)
3. dI1(x)dx = I0(x)− I1(x)x
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4. dx
nIn(x)
dx = x
nIn−1(x)
Lemma 1. The function
l(c) =
e−nF (c)
2
[I0(nF (c)) + I1(nF (c))]
is strictly decreasing. In addition it is strictly convex if and only if
f ′(c) ≤ nf
2(c)
I1(nF (c))
[I1(nF (c))− I0(nF (c))] + 2f(c)
2
F (c)
Proof. By using the properties of the Bessel functions we have that
l′(c) = −e
−nF (c)
2
f(c)I1(nF (c))
F (c)
< 0
and
l′′ = −e
−nF (c)
2F (c)2
[
F (c)f ′(c)I1(nF (c))− nF (c)f(c)2I1(nF (c)) + nF (c)f2(c)I0(nF (c))− 2f2(c)I1(nF (c))
]
= −e−nF (c)
{
f ′(c)
F (c)
I1(nF (c)) +
nf(c)2
F (c)
[I0(nF (c))− I1(nF (c))]− 2
[
f(c)
F (c)
]2
I1(nF (c))
}
C Proofs of results
This section contains the proofs of our results.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a citizen j of group i with private cost cij . It is individually
rational to vote if and only if the marginal benefit (expressed by the pivot probabilities)
is no smaller than the marginal cost (expressed by the private cost net of the externality
component coming from the behavior of the other citizens).
Since voters use a cutoff rule, we have that λ = F (c¯L) and ρ = F (c¯R). Consider the following
functions
ER(cR, cL) = PR(F (cR), F (cL), θ, n)− δ[1− 2 ((1− θ)F (cL) + θF (cR))]
EL(cR, cL) = PL(F (cL), F (cR), θ, n)− δ[1− 2 ((1− θ)F (cL) + θF (cR))]
They represent the expected payoff from voting, net of the cost of voting. Use them to create
the function T : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 such that
T (cR, cL) = (max {min {ER(cR,cL), 1} , 0} ,max {min {EL(cR,cL), 1} , 0})
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Since this function is continuous we can apply the Brouwer fixed point theorem and conclude
there exist a (c¯R, c¯L) such that T (c¯R, c¯L) = (c¯R, c¯L).
The next step is to show that such a pair corresponds to a cutoff equilibrium of the game.
Whenever c¯j ∈ (0, 1), we have that group j citizens with lover private costs prefer to vote,
and those with higher private costs prefer to abstain. Whenever c¯j = 1, it must be that
Ej(1, ck) > 1 which means that the marginal benefit of voting is larger than all the possible
marginal costs. Last, whenever c¯j = 0, it must be that Ej(0, ck) < 0 which means that the
marginal benefit of voting is smaller than all the possible marginal costs.
Proof of Proposition 2. The first part is a straightforward consequence of the conditions for
corner equilibria.
The second part follows by the following two lemmata.
Lemma 2. There are no equilibria of the type (c¯R, 0), and (0, c¯L).
Proof. Consider the candidate equilibrium (c¯R, 0). We must have
PR(F (c¯R), 0, θ, n) = c¯R + δ(1− 2θF (c¯R))
PL(F (c¯R), 0, θ, n) ≤ δ(1− 2θF (c¯R))
Therefore we must have that
PL(F (c¯R), 0, θ, n) < PR(F (c¯R), 0, θ, n)
However
PL(F (c¯R), 0, θ, n) =
e−F (c¯R)θn
2
(1 + F (c¯R)θn) >
e−F (c¯R)θn
2
= PR(F (c¯R), 0, θ, n)
The same logic can be used to show that the other pair of cutoffs is not an equilibrium.
Lemma 3. A necessary condition for (c¯R, 1) [resp. (1, c¯L)] to be an equilibrium is that
θ > 1/2 [resp. θ < 1/2]. Therefore there are no equilibria of the type (c¯R, 1), and (1, c¯L)
when θ = 1/2.
Proof. Consider the pair (c¯R, 1). For it to be an equilibrium we must have
PR(F (c¯R), 1, θ, n) = c¯R + δ[1− 2(θF (c¯R) + 1− θ)]
PL(F (c¯R), 1, θ, n) ≥ 1 + δ[1− 2(θF (c¯R) + 1− θ)]
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Therefore we must have that
PL(F (c¯R), 1, θ, n) > PR(F (c¯R), 1, θ, n) (C-1)
Since we are looking at strictly positive voting probabilities, the pivot probabilities can be
approximated by using (A-7) and (A-8)
PR(F (cR), 1, 1/2, n) ≈e
−n/2(
√
F (cR)−1)2
2
√
2npi
√
F (cR)
√
F (cR) + 1√
F (cR)
PL(F (cR), 1, 1/2, n) ≈e
−n/2(
√
F (cR)−1)2
2
√
2npi
√
F (cR)
[
√
F (cR) + 1]
and therefore inequality (C-1) becomes√
F (c¯R)θ
1− θ >
√
1− θ
F (c¯R)θ
This condition is possible, for F (c¯R) ∈ (0, 1), only if θ > 1/2. In a similar fashion we can
show that θ < 1/2 is necessary for the other pair of cutoffs to be an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. Based on Proposition 2, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 it is enough to show
that the interior equilibria, when they exist, are symmetric. When F (cj) > 0 for all j, and n
is large, we can approximate the pivot probabilities by using (A-7) and (A-8)
PR(F (cR), F (cL), 1/2, n) ≈e
−n/2(
√
F (cR)−
√
F (cL))
2
2
√
2npi
√
F (cL)F (cR)
√
F (cR) +
√
F (cL)√
F (cR)
(C-2)
PL(F (cR), F (cL), 1/2, n) ≈e
−n/2(
√
F (cR)−
√
F (cL))
2
2
√
2npi
√
F (cL)F (cR)
√
F (cR) +
√
F (cL)√
F (cL)
(C-3)
Notice that the conditions for interior equilibria are equivalent to√
F (cL)
F (cR)
=
cR + δ[1− F (cR)− F (cL)]
cL + δ[1− F (cR)− F (cL)] (C-4)
PL(F (cR), F (cL), n) = cL + δ[1− F (cR)− F (cL)] (C-5)
Let (c¯L, c¯R) be an interior equilibrium. Substituting c¯L in the previous equations, it is easy
to verify that cR = c¯L is a solution. Now we prove that the solution (c¯L, c¯L) is unique.
Let l(cR) and r(cR) be respectively the left and the right sides of (C-4) when cL = c¯L. We
have that r(cR) is a decreasing function while with some more calculations we obtain that
sign {r′(cR)} = sign {c¯L + δ[1− F (cR)− F (c¯L)] + δf(cR)(cR − c¯L)}. Note that by (C-5), we
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must have that c¯L + δ[1− F (cR)− F (c¯L)] ≥ 0. Therefore sign {r′(cR)} > 0 for cR > c¯L, and
no equilibrium (cL, cR) = (c¯L, c¯L + ε), ε 6= 0 exists. In a similar way, if we fix cR = c¯L we
have that no equilibrium (cL, cR) = (c¯L + ε, c¯L), ε 6= 0 exists.
Proof of Proposition 4. Write H(c) = l(c)− r(c). The interior equilibria are therefore all the
values of c for which H(c) = 0. The proof relies on the study of the sign of the following
product: H(0) ·H(1). Whenever H(0) ·H(1) < 0, H(c) = 0 can only have (generically) an
odd number of solutions and will have at least one. Whenever H(0) ·H(1) > 0, H(c) = 0 can
only have (generically) an even number of solutions and possibly none. Now remark that
H(0) =
1
2
− δ
H(1) ≈ (2npi)−1/2 − 1 + δ
Therefore when δ < 1/2 we have that H(0) > 0 and H(1) < 0, since n > 1. Likewise, when
δ > 1− (2npi)−1/2 we have that H(0) < 0 and H(1) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Remember that M is defined so that f(M) ≥ f(c) for all c. When
δ < [2f(M)]−1, r(c) is always increasing regardless of F (c). In fact,
r′(c) = 1− 2δf(c)
Since l(c) is always decreasing, we conclude that H(c) is decreasing. Since [2f(M)]−1 < 1/2,
we have that H(0) ·H(1) < 0 and therefore the uniqueness result follows.
We have that r(cm) = cm and
l(cm) ≈ (npi)−1/2
and therefore H(cm) < 0 if and only if npi > c
−2
m . This allows us to conclude that the solution
to H(c) = 0 is to the left of cm and therefore the equilibrium turnout rate is lower than 50%.
We now need to show that as δ grows, the solution to H(c) = 0 decreases, thus generating
lower equilibrium turnout. By the implicit function theorem we have that
dc
dδ
= − 2F (c)− 1
l′(c)− 1 + 2δf(c)
The numerator is positive since the solution to H(c) = 0 is to the left of the median. The
denominator is also negative since l(c) is a decreasing function of c and δ < [2f(M)]−1. Thus
the solution to H(c) = 0 is a decreasing function of δ.
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Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose δ > 1 − (2pin)−1/2. We have that H(1) > 0. In addition,
since npi > c−2m , we know that H(cm) < 0. Therefore there exists at least one interior
equilibrium with high turnout.
We also know that
dc
dδ
= − 2F (c)− 1
l′(c)− 1 + 2δf(c)
We now have that the numerator is positive since c > cm. We also have that the denominator
is positive. In fact, the denominator is just H ′(c) and at the smallest of the high turnout
equilibria, H(c) crosses the horizontal axis from below and therefore the function is increasing.
C.1 Corner solutions with group specific conformism
This section proves Proposition 10. The analysis is carried in more detail, so that the results
can be spelled out more precisely.
Proposition 17. When conformism is group based the strategy profile (0, 1) is an equilibrium
for all θ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if δ ≥ 1− e−n(1−θ)2 .
In addition, let
δ0 =
e−n(1−θ)
2
[1 + n(1− θ)]
and
δ1 = 1− e
−n(1−θ)
2
There are no equilibria (0, c¯L) if δ < δ0. When δ ∈ (δ0, 1/2), if an equilibrium of the above
type exists, then we have that (generically) they are an odd number. When δ ∈ (1/2, δ1], there
is (generically) an even number (and possibly zero) of equilibria (0, c¯L). Finally, when δ > δ1
there is (generically) an odd number of equilibria (0, c¯L).
Proof. Let x denote the share of one’s group’s citizens that chooses to vote. With group
based conformism, given the strategy profile (0, c¯L), we have that x = 0 for group R citizens
and x = F (c¯L) for group L citizens. Therefore, adapting from inequalities (3) and (6), the
conditions for a corner equilibrium (0, 1) boil down to
δ ≥ max
{
1− e
−n(1−θ)
2
, [1 + n(1− θ)]e
−n(1−θ)
2
}
= 1− e
−n(1−θ)
2
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where the equality follows because
en(1−θ) >
2 + n(1− θ)
2
for all n > 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1).
Similarly, the conditions for the equilibrium (0, c¯L) become
e−F (c¯L)(1−θ)n
2
= c¯L + δ(1− 2F (c¯L)) (C-6)
δ >
e−F (c¯L)(1−θ)n
2
(1 + F (c¯L)(1− θ)n) (C-7)
Now observe that the study of equation (C-6) parallels Proposition 4. In addition,
e−F (c¯L)(1−θ)n
2
(1 + F (c¯L)(1− θ)n) ≥ e
−F (c¯L)(1−θ)n
2
for all c¯L ∈ [0, 1] with equality holding at c¯L = 0. Moreover, inequality (C-7) is always
satisfied whenever δ ≥ 1/2 and c¯L > 0. Finally, when δ < δ0, we have that inequality (C-7)
is never met.
Proposition 17 shows us that equilibria of the type (0, barcL) are guaranteed to exist whenever
the preference for conformism is sufficiently strong. And replicating the analysis done for the
interior equilibria of the base model, we can also conclude that such equilibria will be unique
after δ meets a certain threshold.
With exact same arguments we can also prove the following result.
Proposition 18. When conformism is group based, the strategy profile (1, 0) is an equilibrium
for all θ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if δ ≥ 1− e−nθ2 .
In addition, let
δ0 =
e−nθ
2
[1 + nθ]
and
δ1 = 1− e
−nθ
2
There are no equilibria (c¯R, 0) if δ < δ0. When δ ∈ (δ0, 1/2), if an equilibrium of the above
type exists, then we have that (generically) they are an odd number. When δ ∈ (1/2, δ1], there
is (generically) an even number (and possibly zero) of equilibria (c¯R, 0). Finally, when δ > δ1
there is (generically) an odd number of equilibria (c¯R, 0).
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Proof. Let x denote the share of one’s group’s citizens that chooses to vote. With group based
conformism, given the strategy profile (ρ, 0), we have that x = 0 for group L citizens and
x = ρ for group R citizens. Therefore, adapting from inequalities (5) and (4), the conditions
for a corner equilibrium (1, 0) boil down to
δ ≥ max
{
1− e
−nθ
2
, [1 + nθ]
e−nθ
2
}
= 1− e
−nθ
2
Similarly, the conditions for the equilibrium (c¯R, 0) become
e−F (c¯R)nθ
2
= c¯R + δ(1− 2F (c¯R))
δ >
e−F (c¯R)nθ
2
(1 + F (c¯R)nθ)
and the exact same logic as before applies.
Last, consider the possibility of corner equilibria of the type (1, c¯L) and (ρ, 1). The conditions
for the strategy profile (1, c¯L) to be an equilibrium boil down to
PR(1, F (c¯L), θ, n) ≥ 1− δ (C-8)
PL(1, F (c¯L), θ, n) = c¯L + δ(1− 2F (c¯L)) (C-9)
Now remark the following: PR(1, λ, θ, n) has a peak at λ =
θ
1−θ . In fact
PR(1, λ, θ, n) =
e−n[(1−θ)λ+θ]
2
[
I0(2n
√
θ(1− θ)λ) +
√
(1− θ)λ
θ
I1(2n
√
θ(1− θ)λ)
]
By letting x = 2n
√
θ(1− θ)λ one gets
PR(1, x, θ, n) =
e−
x2
4nθ
−nθ
2
[
I0(x) +
x
2nθ
I1(x)
]
which has first derivative given by (see properties of Bessel functions)
dPR(1, x, θ, n)
dx
=
e−
x2
4nθ
−nθ
2
[
I1(x) +
x
2nθ
I0(x)− x
2nθ
I0(x)−
( x
2nθ
)2
I1(x)
]
which therefore is positive if and only if
1 ≥ x
2nθ
which holds if and only if (just plug back the definition of x)
λ ≤ θ
1− θ
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In addition, the maximum is interior if and only if θ < 1/2. When the maximum is interior,
the minimum is at either corner. In this case the value of the minimum is given by
min
{
1
2
e−nθ,
1
2
e−n
[
I0
(
2n
√
θ(1− θ)
)
+
√
1− θ
θ
I1
(
2n
√
θ(1− θ)
)]}
Also, for any θ ≥ 1/2 the function is strictly increasing and has a maximum at λ = 1 and a
minimum at λ = 0. In this case, the value of the minimum is given by
PR(1, 0, θ, n) =
1
2
e−nθ
Therefore, whenever δ > minλ{PR(1, λ, θ, n)} we have that inequality (C-8) is always satisfied
and therefore it is enough to rely on the analysis done for the interior equilibria in the base
model. Specifically we have the following sufficiency result.
Proposition 19. Let δ0 = 1−minθ minλ PR(1, λ, θ, n), and δ1 = 1− PL(1, 1, θ, n). Suppose
δ > max{δ0, δ1}. There is, generically an odd number of equilibria of the type (1, F (c¯L)).
Similarly, the equilibrium conditions for the strategy profile (c¯R, 1) are given by
PL(F (c¯R), 1, θ, n) ≥ 1− δ
PR(F (c¯R), 1, θ, n) = c¯R + δ(1− 2F (c¯R))
And a completely analogous reasoning holds. Namely:
Proposition 20. Let δ0 = 1−minθ minλ PL(ρ, 1, θ, n), and δ1 = 1− PR(1, 1, θ, n). Suppose
δ > max{δ0, δ1}. There is, generically an odd number of equilibria of the type (F (c¯R), 1).
C.2 Multiple interior equilibria with heterogenous δ
Proof of Proposition 15. Rewrite equation (17) as
c = δ(2λ− 1) + P (λ, n)
We focus on the case of λ ≥ 1/2 since we are interested in the possibility of multiple interior
equilibria with high turnout.
By the convolution formula, the probability that c ≤ δ(2λ− 1) + P (λ, n) is given by
Probc,δ =
1
∆
∫ ∆
0
Fc(δ(2λ− 1) + P (λ, n))dδ
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which can be further computed as
Probc,δ =

1
∆
∫ ∆
0 [δ(2λ− 1) + P (λ, n)]dδ if ∆(2λ− 1) + P (λ, n) ≤ 1
1
∆
∫ B(λ)
0 [δ(2λ− 1) + P (λ, n)]dδ + 1∆
∫ ∆
B(λ) dδ if ∆(2λ− 1) + P (λ, n) > 1
where B(λ) = 1−P (λ,n)2λ−1 . After some lines of algebra we get
Probc,δ =

(2λ−1)∆
2 + P (λ, n) if ∆(2λ− 1) + P (λ, n) ≤ 1
1− (1−P (λ,n))22∆(2λ−1) if ∆(2λ− 1) + P (λ, n) > 1
Note that P (λ, n) can be approximated by (2npiλ)−1/2 because we are working under the
assumption of λ > 1/2. Therefore one can see that there exists a unique λ ∈ (1/2, 1) for
which P (λ, n) = 1−∆(2λ− 1).
Let I− = {λ ∈ [1/2, 1]|2λ∆ + P (λ, n) ≤ 1 + ∆}. Let I+ = {λ ∈ [1/2, 1]|2λ∆ + P (λ, n) >
1 + ∆}. First note that there is no fixed point for λ ∈ I−. Suppose there is one, then it must
satisfy
2λ(∆− 1) + 2P (λ, n)−∆ = 0
Solving for P (λ, n)
P (λ, n) =
∆
2
− λ(∆− 1)
Since P (1/2, n) < ∆/2, both sides of the above equation are decreasing function of λ, and
the right hand side is also linear, the existence of a fixed point requites P (1) > 1−∆/2. In
other words, necessary condition for such a fixed point to exist is that
∆ > 2(1− P (1))
Now plug P (λ, n) = ∆2 − λ(∆ − 1) into the inequality constraint contained in I−, which
generates the condition
λ ≤ 2 + ∆
2(1 + ∆)
In other words, if such a point exists, λ needs to be bounded above by 2+∆2(1+∆) . This condition
puts also a bound on P (λ, n), which needs to satisfy the following inequality
P (λ, n) ≥ 1 + ∆
2
Nevertheless, since we also need ∆ > 2(1− P (1)), it must be the case that
P (λ, n) > 1− P (1)
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which generates the desired contradiction.
Therefore the fixed point can only be found in the set I+. The fixed point problem can be
rewritten as
(1− P (λ, n))2 = 2∆(2λ− 1)(1− λ)
The left hand side increases from 1/4 to (1 − P (1))2, a number very close to 1. The right
hand side is positive in the range 1/2 and 1, is zero at the extremes, and has maximum value
equal to ∆/4 at λ = 3/4.
Therefore there are two fixed points if and only if
∆
4
> (1− P (3/4))2
Last, focus on the inequality constraint contained in I+. It requires P (λ) > 1−∆(2λ− 1).
By using the lower bound on ∆ we see that this inequality implies that
1−∆(2λ− 1) < 1− 4(1− P (3/4))2 < 0
if and only if P (3/4) < 1/2, which is true for all n. In fact
P (3/4, n) ≈
√
2
3npi
<
1
2
if and only npi > 8/3, which holds for all n > 1. This allows to conclude that the two fixed
points are within the range of values for λ and concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 16. Given our assumptions, Fc(c) = c(2−c), with c ∈ [0, 1] and Fδ(δ) =
δ2/4 with δ ∈ [0, 2]. Using the convolution formula, we have that
Probc,δ (c+ δ(1− 2λ) ≤ P (λ, n)) =
∫ 2
0
Fc (P (λ, n) + δ(2λ− 1)) δ
2
dδ
We want to show that there are two interior equilibria with λ ≥ 1/2. The above probability
can be written as
Probc,δ =

∫ 2
0 [δ(2λ− 1) + P (λ, n)][2− P (λ, n)− δ(2λ− 1)] δ2dδ if 4λ+ P (λ, n) ≤ 3∫ B(λ)
0 [δ(2λ− 1) + P (λ, n)][2− P (λ, n)− δ(2λ− 1)] δ2dδ +
∫ 2
B(λ)
δ
2dδ if 4λ+ P (λ, n) > 3
with B(λ) = 1−P (λ,n)2λ−1 . After some algebra one gets
Probc,δ =

−8λ2 − P (λ, n)2 + 83λ[5− 2P (λ, n)]− 143 [1− P (λ, n)] if 4λ+ P (λ, n) ≤ 3
23−96λ(1−λ)+4P (λ,n)(1+P (λ,n)2)−P (λ,n)2(6+P (λ,n))
24(2λ−1)2 if 4λ+ P (λ, n) > 3
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As λ > 1/2, we can approximate P (λ, n) with (2npiλ)−1/2. The analytical analysis of this
fixed point problem is a little cumbersome. However numerical computations allows us to
prove the result holds. A graphical analysis of the problem is provided in figure 6.
[Figure 6 about here.]
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δ = 0
δ = 0.5
δ = 0.91
r(c)
Figure 1: Equilibrium analysis when costs are uniformly distributed, population size n = 100,
and θ = 1/2. The curve l(c) is drawn for different values of δ.
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δ = 0
δ = 0.3
δ = 0.91
r(c)
Figure 2: Equilibrium analysis for the distribution F (c) = c3, population size n = 100 and
θ = 1/2. The curve l(c) is drawn for different values of δ.
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δ = 0
δ = 0.45
δ = 1.06
r(c)
Figure 3: Equilibrium analysis for a power distribution with parameters 1 and 1/4 and
population size n = 100 and θ = 1/2. The curve l(c) is drawn for different values of δ.
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δ = 0
δ = 0.4
δ = 1.06
r(c)
Figure 4: Equilibrium analysis for the distribution F (c) = 1 − (1 − c)3 and population size
n = 100 and θ = 1/2. The curve l(c) is drawn for different values of δ.
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δ = 0
δ = 0.45
δ = 1.16
r(c)
Figure 5: Equilibrium analysis for a distribution with modes at M1 = 0.1 and M2 = 0.9, and
population size n = 100 and population size n = 100 and θ = 1/2. The curve l(c) is drawn
for different values of δ.
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Figure 6: High turnout equilibria with heterogenous δ, for n = 100 (blue), n = 10, 000 (red),
and n = 10, 000, 000 (green).
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